The Italians were noobs at pretty much everything. Even back then, contemporary sources remarked at how laughable and out of date their tactics and vehicles were. These are the people who sent troops to Russia wearing boots that were literally made of cardboard.
Eh, more like radar is crazy OP in night battles. At night, the Royal Navy could get within 3-5km of the Regia Marina ships without being seen. Very often, the Italian ships didn't realize what was happening until they were hit with a point blank broadside/torpedo barrage.
You know, it's kinda funny to me because when I played Hearts of Iron III, the Italian navy tended to do better during night than during day. Probably had something to do with blockading all of their ports with numerically superior battleship fleets then sending carrier air strikes when they could be spared. With the US Navy. In Summer of 1941.
By the time Japan declared war on the US in November of 1941 the Italian Navy did not exist anymore.
I guess the only thing that is good to Italians are their flying aces huh? Maybe. Maybe not.
Some of their planes are decent, that I know. But IIRC they were still considered out dated compared to the Allied and German. Maybe I should start reading up on Italian planes.
The biggest problem is that the Italian navy designs were made to counter the carrier-less French navy: their light cruisers were designed to chase down and destroy the French destroyers and lure enemy light cruisers into heavy cruiser/battleship range;
Their heavy cruisers would take down on the equally fast but outgunned French light cruisers while luring enemy heavy cruisers and battleships into battleship range;
The Italian battleships would destroy enemy battleships with their superior range and avoid counterfire with their fast speed;
Italian destroyers would act as commerce raiders and would use their extreme speed to avoid battleship gunfire and torpedo them with impunity; and the Italian air force would use their bases on the Mediterranean sea to provide support to the navy.
Such strategy would be (theorically) effective against the intended opponent, but of course the Italian navy ended up facing the Royal Navy instead...
Eh, more like radar is crazy OP in night battles. At night, the Royal Navy could get within 3-5km of the Regia Marina ships without being seen. Very often, the Italian ships didn't realize what was happening until they were hit with a point blank broadside/torpedo barrage.
Which is rather the point, the Japanese didn't have radar early on either but other systems and training still let them fight effectively and the British radar of the 1940-41 period shouldn't be given TOO much credit. Just look at all the issues US radar had in the Solomons which was actually somewhat advanced over those earlier British sets, radar was not a panacea, it was a tool that had to be combined with training and sound doctrine to be effective. The Royal Navy drilled hard for night actions, second only to the Japanese really and they reaped the benefits.
This was compounded by Italian night combat capability that was effectively nonexistent going into the war. It wasn't trained for at all, they had no systems for night action, in the case of Matapan the guns weren't even loaded because they couldn't fathom a night attack was a possibility. This was never really corrected and they kept getting used as punching bags by the British in night actions throughout the most pitched portion of the campaign.
The ships the Italian navy did have were by and large quite good and on the whole the crews were fairly competent and tactical leadership not awful (their naval special forces also deserve mention as very good for the period). The problem was that the strategic leadership going into the war had been very off base. Chances to build at least some carriers had been neglected in favor of battleship construction and some dubious modernization projects of WWI era capital ships. This was a symptom of a wider conservationism that also influenced why they never really considered night fighting capabilities in the pre-war period.
Even so, the Italian navy was a major factor in keeping the Afrika corps alive to be perfectly honest, the fact it managed to hold out as long as it did is not something to be scoffed at. Indeed most of the major battles in the area centered around one sides convoy or another. This also often forced it to put to sea outside the range of effective land based fighter cover, or under less then ideal conditions because of some supply emergency and consequently suffered a number of times from comparatively rather feeble carrier attacks or night ambushes.
laisy said:
Some of their planes are decent, that I know. But IIRC they were still considered out dated compared to the Allied and German. Maybe I should start reading up on Italian planes.
The planes were actually quite competitive up to say early 1944, the problem was they never produced them in anything like the needed numbers (and as is so often the case with high performance Italian machines they also had reputations as somewhat finicky aircraft). If you start bringing in end war "super planes" like P-51Hs, P-47M, 190Ds, etc they start to lagging a bit though since their development mostly stopped with the surrender in 1943.
The standard orders from the Italian Navy were not to train at night because they would not fight at night.
Take a table top game like General Quarters III. Then take the Italian and French navies into a night battle. They might never see each other even if they pass within a kilometer of each other. If you want to have an entirely unfair night fight without resorting to radar, you have the Japanese against the Italians. The Japanese will usually completely destroy the Italian forces without the Italians even firing a shot at the Japanese, because they never spot them. We had one were the Japanese player was able to actual reload his torpedoes in combat because his destroyers were unmolested for a long period of time, as the Italians could not spot them at all. They came back around for a second torpedo spread. That is practically unheard of in these games, even though it is possible. Most other countries can at least keep contact with the Japanese after the first torpedo spread and keep them evading so they can't reload.
Totally unfair is American late war radar and radar fire control, after they have night training. Then they are as good as the Japanese, and can fire even if they can't see the target.
The Italians were noobs at pretty much everything. Even back then, contemporary sources remarked at how laughable and out of date their tactics and vehicles were. These are the people who sent troops to Russia wearing boots that were literally made of cardboard.
That's a myth; more like the boots were made of poor quality, over-recycled leather.
The lack of proper night fighting doctrine and equipment was a serious issue, absolutely; it showed both the reluctance to improve upon an obsolete fighting doctrine (very rigid, moreover) and a deafness to signals that foreign navies were training in this area (the RM was fully aware of the RN vessels having a lot of night training). The only decision in this matter was to fit the Littorio-class battleships with some howitzers for firing star shells, which ended up being useless anyway.
However, it should be pointed out that both require resources and fuel, and even before the war the Regia Marina wasn't particularly stocked with either. In this case, the US Navy was in a better place, yet it managed to show its inferiority to the IJN, by letting it destroy four heavy cruisers, despite having the radar. It took a long time and painful losses for the USN to reach and then surpass the Japanese.
Anyway... what is the problem with Abruzzi-chan? She was a pretty damn fine light cruiser, with very good firepower (ten 6-inch guns), excellent protection (a total of 130 mm of horizontal protection) and good speed. Only few light cruisers designs surpassed it late in the war.
And light cruisers can be more easily equipped and trained for night fighting than heavy cruisers and battleships. With some more training, the fitting of the "Gufo" radar and some experience with it, she could be expected to operate at night, perhaps not as well as other ships, but in a less than dismal way.
Well, it has been a sorta stereotype that WWII Italians sucks in combat. And the Allied propaganda to make the Axis looks pathetic probably just add fuel to fire.
And to be fair, the IJN has lots of training and experience in night battle, so the USN who are still new in that needed time to adapt to it.
As for Abruzzi-chan, its her name that is very long. Its quite unusual to have such a long name.
Well, it has been a sorta stereotype that WWII Italians sucks in combat. And the Allied propaganda to make the Axis looks pathetic probably just add fuel to fire.
And to be fair, the IJN has lots of training and experience in night battle, so the USN who are still new in that needed time to adapt to it.
As for Abruzzi-chan, its her name that is very long. Its quite unusual to have such a long name.
A stereotype that has a basis of truth in the fact that, for many and various reasons, the Italian ships' efficiency was impaired and never, even in the best ones, at the same level of their opponents.
It should also be noted that the Regia Marina's perceived most likely enemy was the Marine Nationale, whose condition was not that better. Had it been its opponent, instead of the Royal Navy, the Regia Marina would have performed somewhat more consistently.
In any case, the Regia Marina's rather poor record in terms of naval battles has drawn away attention from the fact that it succeeded in its strategic mission: keeping the sea lanes between Italy and North Africa open. Despite the British's best efforts, most of what was sent reached its port of call.
Of course, it was never enough to begin with, but that's another story. Without having prepared for a battle of convoys, lacking proper escort units, having to establish a collaboration with the Regia Aeronautica from scratch, it was nevertheless a pretty good success.
Well, it has been a sorta stereotype that WWII Italians sucks in combat. And the Allied propaganda to make the Axis looks pathetic probably just add fuel to fire.
And to be fair, the IJN has lots of training and experience in night battle, so the USN who are still new in that needed time to adapt to it.
As for Abruzzi-chan, its her name that is very long. Its quite unusual to have such a long name.
This is why people would prefer her sistership, the Giuseppe Garibaldi.
Some of their planes are decent, that I know. But IIRC they were still considered out dated compared to the Allied and German. Maybe I should start reading up on Italian planes.
You should; some Italian planes were by all means competitive.
The Macchi C.202, despite its anaemic weaponry, was a match for both the Spitfire Mk. V and the P-40.
The Macchi C.205V was an incremental improvement with finally adequate weaponry.
The Fiat G.55 was a match for the P-51D, strong and with a powerful armament.
A 1944 prototype, the Fiat G.56 (with a Daimler-Benz DB.603 engine) would have been even better, but was never approved for production.
The game literally meant "Battleship Girls". Its surprisingly original, even though its sort of a Kancolle ripoff.
Yeah. The artwork is very original which I totally look at with grudging respect... That Lady Lex and Sara... That Albacore Loli (USN's lewd SS) and the Royal Navy's cute Monitors... Don't forget Andrea Doria as well, which even Kiyoshimo be jealous.
Battleship Girls or whatever it was called in Chinese.
laisy said:
The game literally meant "Battleship Girls". Its surprisingly original, even though its sort of a Kancolle ripoff.
But Garibaldi is not there.
The Italian ships that are in the game as of now are Andrea Doria, Vittorio Veneto, Camicia Nera and Aviere.
Besides, I don't like that game very much; while I can understand Littorio's love for pasta in KanColle, there are several things in Warship Girls that I don't approve of:
- Veneto looks like a female Mafioso (wow, original much)?
- Andrea Doria is called the "biggest monitor" because of its low firepower in the beginning (alright, she carried only 12-in guns, but then where are the Courbet, the Gangut, the Arkansas?).
- All the Italian equipment, except the Pugliese anti-torpedo bulkhead, is played for laughs (Italian coffee? A little known and used Italian aircraft chosen only because it looks ridicolous, while all the other nations have their historical ones?.
So, sorry, but they are really going about this the wrong way, IMHO.
The Italian ships that are in the game as of now are Andrea Doria, Vittorio Veneto, Camicia Nera and Aviere.
Besides, I don't like that game very much; while I can understand Littorio's love for pasta in KanColle, there are several things in Warship Girls that I don't approve of:
- Veneto looks like a female Mafioso (wow, original much)?
- Andrea Doria is called the "biggest monitor" because of its low firepower in the beginning (alright, she carried only 12-in guns, but then where are the Courbet, the Gangut, the Arkansas?).
- All the Italian equipment, except the Pugliese anti-torpedo bulkhead, is played for laughs (Italian coffee? A little known and used Italian aircraft chosen only because it looks ridicolous, while all the other nations have their historical ones?.
So, sorry, but they are really going about this the wrong way, IMHO.
I didn't play it so I don't know lol. But I do see screenshots of it and review from Kancolle player, and it does seems like a great game.
I didn't play it so I don't know lol. But I do see screenshots of it and review from Kancolle player, and it does seems like a great game.
If you talk about mechanics, you might as well be right. I don't play it too.
However, it's about characterization that I find this... irritating, to say the least. It's not like Richelieu holds a baguette, or something like that!
If you talk about mechanics, you might as well be right. I don't play it too.
However, it's about characterization that I find this... irritating, to say the least. It's not like Richelieu holds a baguette, or something like that!
Quite. It is really touch and go, as far as characterization and design go. Repulse and Renown are great; Alaska and Guam (and the Italian ships) are... forgettable.
Eh, more like radar is crazy OP in night battles. At night, the Royal Navy could get within 3-5km of the Regia Marina ships without being seen. Very often, the Italian ships didn't realize what was happening until they were hit with a point blank broadside/torpedo barrage.
It was not always like that, especially until the middle period of the war, when radar (especially on light ships, fitted in less optimal positions) was not that accurate.
Take a look at this, for example: two Italian torpedo-boats spotted their opponents first, despite them being without radar. The resulting engagement ended up in an Italian victory, since they crippled a destroyer which had to be scuttled and damaged another in exchange for one torpedo-boat sank and another damaged, and the merchantmen that the British destroyers meant to sink escaped safely.
Radar could be a big help, but it did not guarantee victory, if the other side was prepared (and, after lots of hard times at night, the Italians had by then learned how to train lookouts and how to fight at night).
In this occasion too the British radar failed to give warning of at least the first attack done by Italian torpedo-boats, attack unsuccessful because of it being executed piecemeal and not in a coordinated way, and because of the insufficient and inadequate training for night fighting (despite the fact that destroyers and torpedo-boats were very much supposed to fight at night).
The lack of proper night fighting doctrine and equipment was a serious issue, absolutely; it showed both the reluctance to improve upon an obsolete fighting doctrine (very rigid, moreover) and a deafness to signals that foreign navies were training in this area (the RM was fully aware of the RN vessels having a lot of night training). The only decision in this matter was to fit the Littorio-class battleships with some howitzers for firing star shells, which ended up being useless anyway.
However, it should be pointed out that both require resources and fuel, and even before the war the Regia Marina wasn't particularly stocked with either. In this case, the US Navy was in a better place, yet it managed to show its inferiority to the IJN, by letting it destroy four heavy cruisers, despite having the radar. It took a long time and painful losses for the USN to reach and then surpass the Japanese.
This is something of a myth too, in point of fact when one actually goes through and looks at the losses the the US traded even or perhaps even better with Japan even in the worst period, which is somewhat impressive given that the primary weapon of their light units (torpedoes) flat out wasn't working at the height of the battle. In point of fact in terms of night gunnery technology there was not much to choose from between the sides, Japanese night optics were better, but the US did have radar and it did help a number of times even if it wasn't omniscience (but that went both ways the normally sharp eyed Japanese look outs failed them badly several times as well). Japan had really only two concrete advantages: torpedoes that worked and flashless powder. US DDs repeatedly attained positions and fired torpedoes in these battles, but the results can be counted on the fingers of one hand. It's impossible to say what damage they would have done if many of them hadn't run deep or failed to explode, but it's quite likely it would've significantly raised the Japanese casualty list.
This then was not so much a training or doctrine failure as a truly criminal technical failing, not to say doctrine failures didn't exist. In particular the lack of aggressive destroyer use and tying them to tightly to cruisers was an issue, but then again given how fucking awful torpedoes were at that moment it seems highly debatable if cutting them loose would've yielded much better results.
In any case yes the USN lost several cruisers, but Japan managed to loose two of it's most useful capital ships in the same period in night actions, tonnage wise and arguably strategically that was a larger blow. Japan also itself lost three 'heavy' cruisers in the area Fukutara, Kinugasa, and Kako, and Aoba was shot so full of holes she was absent for the entire rest of the campaign, plus the light cruisers Yura was also sunk. Admittedly none of those was as large as the US cruisers lost or damaged, but Japan could hardly afford to be trading at even a slight advantage if it wanted to win. What actually happened later on into 1943 wasn't gaining parity, it was attaining superiority. Losses in 1943 overall began to tilt toward the US a set back here or there aside and by the final phase of the year the US had attained a clear superiority in all aspect of surface action night or day.
"A long time" is also debatable, parity IMO was attained by early 1943 after perhaps six months, clear superiority by the late summer of 1943 or perhaps a year or so. Italy had the better part of three years of war and never really attained any sort of effective night capability.
Anyway... what is the problem with Abruzzi-chan? She was a pretty damn fine light cruiser, with very good firepower (ten 6-inch guns), excellent protection (a total of 130 mm of horizontal protection) and good speed. Only few light cruisers designs surpassed it late in the war.
Nothing wrong with her, in point of fact in another post I made I considered her one of the better light cruiser designs of the period, with a cavet that detailed technical information on her seems lacking in English sources. In particular one needs to take monolithic numbers for armor with a very large grain of salt. For instance the Portland class could be said to have a 145mm horizontal protection... which it does, over a small area around the magazines, it's primary machinery belt is a poultry 83mm however. (I also haven't been able to find a source that conclusively says if Abruzzi had face hardened plates, Zara did and she was earlier so it would seem logical, but then again logic and logistics sometimes conflict) Speed is another issue, many sources for instance credit the Fletcher with 38 knots, that's nonsense, that was the hoped for design speed in service they actually maxed out at a bit over 36, 35 and change was probably a more realistic speed for a new or recently overhauled ship.
Regardless though by a basic glance at her gross numbers she appears competitive with the top end light cruisers of the war era... in daylight. The issue was that Sendai was talking specifically about night battles and frankly I have no reason to believe she wouldn't blow goats in that arena like the Italian navy in general.
And light cruisers can be more easily equipped and trained for night fighting than heavy cruisers and battleships. With some more training, the fitting of the "Gufo" radar and some experience with it, she could be expected to operate at night, perhaps not as well as other ships, but in a less than dismal way.
Eh light cruisers aren't really inherently better night fighters, and Abruzzi in particular is clearly in the "calling this a light cruiser is a farce, it's a heavy cruiser with six inch guns" class. The more rapid firing rate of 6 inch ships might've been an advantage in a night actions early on, since these tended almost by definition to be short ranged affairs where the rapid fire rate of six inch guns could be exploited, but the advent of improving radar would muddy the water. A key fact to keep in mind with most six inch ships is that their often stupendous listed rates of fire were only attained at low angles were continuous loading is possible, increase range and add several seconds depressing and elevating guns to load and firing angle between salvos and some more observing fall of shot and suddenly those "machine guns" start looking like bolt actions.
Another thing that must be considered is that by the start of the war by and large most modern cruisers were reasonably well protected from six inch shells, even at fairly close range, but eight inch weapons remained a decidedly dicer issue with immunity zones that really only began at significantly greater distances. (Not shocking given that the average 8 inch AP shell had like twice the mass of a 6 inch weapon) It's the endless debate that may have no real answer more shells or shells more likely to penetrate deeply and do more damage, which is better?
Speaking in purely game terms though Abruzzi in general would be disadvantaged by having a fairly light torpedo battery, although this could be addressed somewhat by mounting Japanese weapons. Torpedoes on cruisers are IMO vastly overrated in value (speaking 'real life' here), but the game being Japanese and with Japanese cruisers having those dubiously huge torpedo batteries has placed a rather high value on them in night battles. Then again this would be an issue of basically any other navies cruisers, only Japan and (briefly) France ever put heavy torpedo batteries on cruisers. Most had just a pittance, and given the lower capability of the torpedoes in those tubes they were of extremely questionable value in general. In general when weight needed to be found for something actually important they tended to be the first thing to go as well.
Speed is another issue, many sources for instance credit the Fletcher with 38 knots, that's nonsense, that was the hoped for design speed in service they actually maxed out at a bit over 36, 35 and change was probably a more realistic speed for a new or recently overhauled ship.
The Fletchers' speed varied, like the Sumners and Gearings after them... sometimes wildly. Several of them actually met or exceeded the design speed; I believe the record for the Fletchers was ~38.6kts (USS Kidd was one of the ones that came close, at the upper 37s). On the other end, you had some of them that struggled to make 34kts (these were promptly sold off to other countries after the war). I believe the record slowest Fletcher was only able to achieve a measly 30kts, which is pitiful no matter how you look at it. This sort of variation is pretty standard in wartime production. So, it's not entirely nonsense when speaking of them, merely exceptions to the rule.
I was going to make a crack about the Sumner's speed and the top-of-class, but the ship in question having their entire stern rebuilt with parts not belonging to that ship class wouldn't be fair (they were otherwise universally sub-par, speed wise, and would have probably made better fodder for an analogy).
Tk3997 said:
A key fact to keep in mind with most six inch ships is that their often stupendous listed rates of fire were only attained at low angles were continuous loading is possible, increase range and add several seconds depressing and elevating guns to load and firing angle between salvos and some more observing fall of shot and suddenly those "machine guns" start looking like bolt actions.
In agreement with this. For an example: the USS Helena, the '6-Inch Machine Gun' herself, had a typical rate of fire of about 5-6rd/min/gun when at any reasonable range... and her crew was still considered machine-like for doing so. A far cry from the listed 8-10rd/min/gun.
This is something of a myth too, in point of fact when one actually goes through and looks at the losses the the US traded even or perhaps even better with Japan even in the worst period, which is somewhat impressive given that the primary weapon of their light units (torpedoes) flat out wasn't working at the height of the battle. In point of fact in terms of night gunnery technology there was not much to choose from between the sides, Japanese night optics were better, but the US did have radar and it did help a number of times even if it wasn't omniscience (but that went both ways the normally sharp eyed Japanese look outs failed them badly several times as well). Japan had really only two concrete advantages: torpedoes that worked and flashless powder. US DDs repeatedly attained positions and fired torpedoes in these battles, but the results can be counted on the fingers of one hand. It's impossible to say what damage they would have done if many of them hadn't run deep or failed to explode, but it's quite likely it would've significantly raised the Japanese casualty list.
This then was not so much a training or doctrine failure as a truly criminal technical failing, not to say doctrine failures didn't exist. In particular the lack of aggressive destroyer use and tying them to tightly to cruisers was an issue, but then again given how fucking awful torpedoes were at that moment it seems highly debatable if cutting them loose would've yielded much better results.
In any case yes the USN lost several cruisers, but Japan managed to loose two of it's most useful capital ships in the same period in night actions, tonnage wise and arguably strategically that was a larger blow. Japan also itself lost three 'heavy' cruisers in the area Fukutara, Kinugasa, and Kako, and Aoba was shot so full of holes she was absent for the entire rest of the campaign, plus the light cruisers Yura was also sunk. Admittedly none of those was as large as the US cruisers lost or damaged, but Japan could hardly afford to be trading at even a slight advantage if it wanted to win. What actually happened later on into 1943 wasn't gaining parity, it was attaining superiority. Losses in 1943 overall began to tilt toward the US a set back here or there aside and by the final phase of the year the US had attained a clear superiority in all aspect of surface action night or day.
"A long time" is also debatable, parity IMO was attained by early 1943 after perhaps six months, clear superiority by the late summer of 1943 or perhaps a year or so. Italy had the better part of three years of war and never really attained any sort of effective night capability.
Nothing wrong with her, in point of fact in another post I made I considered her one of the better light cruiser designs of the period, with a cavet that detailed technical information on her seems lacking in English sources. In particular one needs to take monolithic numbers for armor with a very large grain of salt. For instance the Portland class could be said to have a 145mm horizontal protection... which it does, over a small area around the magazines, it's primary machinery belt is a poultry 83mm however. (I also haven't been able to find a source that conclusively says if Abruzzi had face hardened plates, Zara did and she was earlier so it would seem logical, but then again logic and logistics sometimes conflict) Speed is another issue, many sources for instance credit the Fletcher with 38 knots, that's nonsense, that was the hoped for design speed in service they actually maxed out at a bit over 36, 35 and change was probably a more realistic speed for a new or recently overhauled ship.
Regardless though by a basic glance at her gross numbers she appears competitive with the top end light cruisers of the war era... in daylight. The issue was that Sendai was talking specifically about night battles and frankly I have no reason to believe she wouldn't blow goats in that arena like the Italian navy in general.
Eh light cruisers aren't really inherently better night fighters, and Abruzzi in particular is clearly in the "calling this a light cruiser is a farce, it's a heavy cruiser with six inch guns" class. The more rapid firing rate of 6 inch ships might've been an advantage in a night actions early on, since these tended almost by definition to be short ranged affairs where the rapid fire rate of six inch guns could be exploited, but the advent of improving radar would muddy the water. A key fact to keep in mind with most six inch ships is that their often stupendous listed rates of fire were only attained at low angles were continuous loading is possible, increase range and add several seconds depressing and elevating guns to load and firing angle between salvos and some more observing fall of shot and suddenly those "machine guns" start looking like bolt actions.
Another thing that must be considered is that by the start of the war by and large most modern cruisers were reasonably well protected from six inch shells, even at fairly close range, but eight inch weapons remained a decidedly dicer issue with immunity zones that really only began at significantly greater distances. (Not shocking given that the average 8 inch AP shell had like twice the mass of a 6 inch weapon) It's the endless debate that may have no real answer more shells or shells more likely to penetrate deeply and do more damage, which is better?
Speaking in purely game terms though Abruzzi in general would be disadvantaged by having a fairly light torpedo battery, although this could be addressed somewhat by mounting Japanese weapons. Torpedoes on cruisers are IMO vastly overrated in value (speaking 'real life' here), but the game being Japanese and with Japanese cruisers having those dubiously huge torpedo batteries has placed a rather high value on them in night battles. Then again this would be an issue of basically any other navies cruisers, only Japan and (briefly) France ever put heavy torpedo batteries on cruisers. Most had just a pittance, and given the lower capability of the torpedoes in those tubes they were of extremely questionable value in general. In general when weight needed to be found for something actually important they tended to be the first thing to go as well.
Of course, I was speaking only on a tactical level, because it's clear that on the long run the USN would be better equipped to make up for losses. Still, certain failings were displayed, despite a theoretical possibility of them not being there; my point was that the Regia Marina was in a worse place to begin with, in terms of resources to devote to such training (beside the obvious critical mistake of devoting very little attention to that in the first place, of course).
As it was one of the last ships built, and of a balanced design rather than a cardboard one like the early Condottieri or Trento-class, it is safe to assume that it could achieve in wartime a speed just a little bit lower than its nominal ones (i.e. she could reach some 32-33 knots).
What I meant was that, needing less fuel for training, and with proper "night" shells more easily manufactured, it would have been easier to improve in that regard. If we talk in terms of cruisers and their value as night fighters, I agree with you. And I also agree that her relatively light torpedo armament may be a weakness (although I'm not sure wheter in the Mediterranean a cruiser, Italian or Allied, ever used its torpedoes at night, for reference).
The Fletchers' speed varied, like the Sumners and Gearings after them... sometimes wildly. Several of them actually met or exceeded the design speed; I believe the record for the Fletchers was ~38.6kts (USS Kidd was one of the ones that came close, at the upper 37s). On the other end, you had some of them that struggled to make 34kts (these were promptly sold off to other countries after the war). I believe the record slowest Fletcher was only able to achieve a measly 30kts, which is pitiful no matter how you look at it. This sort of variation is pretty standard in wartime production. So, it's not entirely nonsense when speaking of them, merely exceptions to the rule.
No Fletcher in existence ever made 38 knots at a combat loaded weight at rated output. What it could do under a stupidly light 'trial' displacement or if the machinery was brutally forced into an overload condition is irreverent to it's true operation speed. At combat weights on ships that weren't worn out 35-36 knots and change (and probably the lower end of that) was the realistic speed. This was even more so the case because basically as soon as the ships left the yard they began going over initial design weight due to extra AA guns, new directors, radars, etc.
Just because it was a war didn't mean testing stopped and the USN wasn't even close to desperate enough to accept grossly under-performing ships into service. Although it didn't really have too since US manufacturing of engineering plants was world beating and the systems basically always exceeded rated output, often by a fairly large margin, so much in fact that the Navy actually started clamping down on contractors on the grounds that overbuilding engines to such a degree over what was asked for was wasteful! No Fletcher that made 30 knots would've ever been accepted for service so that's nonsense, it's possible a ship forward deployed with some mechanical casualties might have been restricted to that at some point, but that's a different issue.
As for vessels making 33-34 knots, any ship in action for an extended period of time will degrade downward in performance. Destroyers were worked hard during the war and by the end of it many where probably fairly worn out, at that point 33 to 34 knots would be a reasonable speed. With such a glut of them on hand though there was little incentive to refurbish such vessels and of course they would be the first ones sold off. It's highly unlikely those vessels came out of the yard in such conditions though.
In agreement with this. For an example: the USS Helena, the '6-Inch Machine Gun' herself, had a typical rate of fire of about 5-6rd/min/gun when at any reasonable range... and her crew was still considered machine-like for doing so. A far cry from the listed 8-10rd/min/gun.
Auto-loaders were really needed to make best use of intermediate caliber guns, but the demands of the war meant none of them arrived until after it was over. There was some experimental design work post-war on fitting rammers to allow all angle loading on 6"/47 guns post war, with an eye toward allowing the 6 inch batteries of the war era Clevelands still in reserve to contribute useful volume in AA operations if reactivated, but this was never done.
Historynerd said: Of course, I was speaking only on a tactical level, because it's clear that on the long run the USN would be better equipped to make up for losses. Still, certain failings were displayed, despite a theoretical possibility of them not being there; my point was that the Regia Marina was in a worse place to begin with, in terms of resources to devote to such training (beside the obvious critical mistake of devoting very little attention to that in the first place, of course).
It's true that once the war began it probably was too late to catch up given all the other issues they were suddenly facing, but that's kind of an excuse. Particularly with matters of naval doctrine and technology, those are 'long lead' items and even in a protracted war the ablity to plug major glaring holes in time to matter is going to be limited. Given the near total lack of groundwork it probably was basically impossible for Italy to suddenly fit all the needed systems and train all the need tactics in the time they had, but that's still their fault for failing to comprehend a shift every other navy on the planet saw coming. The US had a groundwork at least, it had some doctrine, a reasonable bit of training it thus didn't need to invent so much as refine what existed.
We can what if all day, about them having more resources or more time, or more this or that, but the fact is that historically Italy never really unfucked it's night fighting because it had never prepared for it, and if you fail to prepare you prepare to fail. Quite frankly even if we give the navy more money and more fuel ahead of the war, do you think they spend any of that on preparing for night battle? Or shit even building a carrier or two? Or do they just blow it on a another two or three white elephant battleships that they can't afford to loose and thus can't afford to use? The RM strategic thinking was fundamentally flawed and put them so far behind the eight ball that no amount of resources probably could've caught them up in time.
Their lack of preparation and foresight regarding night actions was just on a completely different level from ANYONE else.
As it was one of the last ships built, and of a balanced design rather than a cardboard one like the early Condottieri or Trento-class, it is safe to assume that it could achieve in wartime a speed just a little bit lower than its nominal ones (i.e. she could reach some 32-33 knots).
The guns are indeed one of the few things data exists on. I'm quite aware of navweaps and they were indeed good guns too, although the director was unlikely to be as good as USN ships and that goes beyond merely lacking radar. (an often under-appreciated fact is that there was allot more to USN fire control dominance then just bolting radars to masts, it was the end result of years of research and focused effort and involved many systems integrated into the ship itself)
What I meant was that, needing less fuel for training, and with proper "night" shells more easily manufactured, it would have been easier to improve in that regard. If we talk in terms of cruisers and their value as night fighters, I agree with you. And I also agree that her relatively light torpedo armament may be a weakness (although I'm not sure wheter in the Mediterranean a cruiser, Italian or Allied, ever used its torpedoes at night, for reference).
I haven't been able to find an instance of a western cruiser torpedoing anything myself under any conditions. This is no shock, the weapons in question were basically equivalent to Mark 15 meaning that at high speed settings they had ranges of less then ten kilometers. No cruiser would ever want to close to such a close range if it could be avoided for any number of reasons hence Allied, Italian, and German cruisers were effectively by default always outside torpedo range when engaging.
This by the way is why I do not consider USN cruisers lacking any torpedoes a major issue and in point of fact think the other nations keeping them was largely a matter of inertia and tradition rather then a logical balancing of cost and benefit. Frankly Japanese cruisers were barely better, Japanese cruisers fired allot of torpedoes... and pretty universally failed to do shit with them. They sank four ships, and one of those was being smothered by so much other shit the torpedo can really only be given partial credit. The total was 1 obsolete DD, 2 obsolete CLs, and then the aforementioned shared credit on a modern cruiser. For all the effort and danger associated with mounting those weapons the results where frankly fairly pathetic, and as noted even that meager result is the BEST showing for cruiser torpedoes of any nation.
Frankly if I have to chose between say two or maybe even four extra twin DP mounts and a bunch of torpedoes on a cruiser I'm taking the AA guns, but KC isn't all that historical.
It's true that once the war began it probably was too late to catch up given all the other issues they were suddenly facing, but that's kind of an excuse. Particularly with matters of naval doctrine and technology, those are 'long lead' items and even in a protracted war the ablity to plug major glaring holes in time to matter is going to be limited. Given the near total lack of groundwork it probably was basically impossible for Italy to suddenly fit all the needed systems and train all the need tactics in the time they had, but that's still their fault for failing to comprehend a shift every other navy on the planet saw coming. The US had a groundwork at least, it had some doctrine, a reasonable bit of training it thus didn't need to invent so much as refine what existed.
We can what if all day, about them having more resources or more time, or more this or that, but the fact is that historically Italy never really unfucked it's night fighting because it had never prepared for it, and if you fail to prepare you prepare to fail. Quite frankly even if we give the navy more money and more fuel ahead of the war, do you think they spend any of that on preparing for night battle? Or shit even building a carrier or two? Or do they just blow it on a another two or three white elephant battleships that they can't afford to loose and thus can't afford to use? The RM strategic thinking was fundamentally flawed and put them so far behind the eight ball that no amount of resources probably could've caught them up in time.
Their lack of preparation and foresight regarding night actions was just on a completely different level from ANYONE else.
The guns are indeed one of the few things data exists on. I'm quite aware of navweaps and they were indeed good guns too, although the director was unlikely to be as good as USN ships and that goes beyond merely lacking radar. (an often under-appreciated fact is that there was allot more to USN fire control dominance then just bolting radars to masts, it was the end result of years of research and focused effort and involved many systems integrated into the ship itself)
I haven't been able to find an instance of a western cruiser torpedoing anything myself under any conditions. This is no shock, the weapons in question were basically equivalent to Mark 15 meaning that at high speed settings they had ranges of less then ten kilometers. No cruiser would ever want to close to such a close range if it could be avoided for any number of reasons hence Allied, Italian, and German cruisers were effectively by default always outside torpedo range when engaging.
This by the way is why I do not consider USN cruisers lacking any torpedoes a major issue and in point of fact think the other nations keeping them was largely a matter of inertia and tradition rather then a logical balancing of cost and benefit. Frankly Japanese cruisers were barely better, Japanese cruisers fired allot of torpedoes... and pretty universally failed to do shit with them. They sank four ships, and one of those was being smothered by so much other shit the torpedo can really only be given partial credit. The total was 1 obsolete DD, 2 obsolete CLs, and then the aforementioned shared credit on a modern cruiser. For all the effort and danger associated with mounting those weapons the results where frankly fairly pathetic, and as noted even that meager result is the BEST showing for cruiser torpedoes of any nation.
Frankly if I have to chose between say two or maybe even four extra twin DP mounts and a bunch of torpedoes on a cruiser I'm taking the AA guns, but KC isn't all that historical.
Of course, I agree. The attention for night fighting should have come much sooner: it didn't, and all that could be done was trying to limit the damage, somehow.
I also agree on the guns, on the fact that they were good but the fire-director installations not being as good as those fitted on USN ships. It is known that, while the theory of fire control was good and so were the core instruments, many auxiliary systems were not as good or as reliable as they could have been, so in less than optimal situations their performance was not as good as that of other ships.
It's a fact, however, that Italian fire was recognized throughout the whole was as relatively accurate, although very often the salvo patterns were dispersed (because of the gun themselves, the gun mountings, or more often than not the much too high tolerance of shell weights). A little known fact is that, during Operation Harpoon, an Italian light cruiser scored a hit (recognized by the British unit stricken) on a minesweeper which was "approx. 26'000 yd" away.
I tend to agree with cruiser torpedoes; perhaps, considering that a hit on them (and especially on Japanese torpedoes, whose oxygen-based design could cause lots of damage in an explosion) could really wreak havock on the ship.
The US Industry chain was the best in the world, yes, but it was not infallible. Quite a few problems slipped through in various ships; many US DDs had problems with excessive stern vibration which induced cavitation on the props which lowered the top speed. This problem would not be addressed until the Gearings. Not all of the pre-Gearing (form what I can tell, ALL of the Sumners had it) DDs had this problem, mind, and those that didn't had relatively higher Top Speeds than their compatriots.
You discredit the speeds achievable by overloading the boilers; however, the US Navy didn't at the time so my claim is still valid. Let's not forget that the US boiler-turbine combos were so over-built that they actually were perfectly safe going 20-25% over the navy's ratings (as you said, they got called on the carpet for this). That being said, let's also not forget that the Boilers and Turbines were made by entirely different contractors than the ships themselves. US Boilers/Turbines were the best in the world, by far (IMHO), but the shipyards themselves were not always top notch (example above, and let's not forget notorious muck ups like Short Circuit SoDak). Remember that the shipyards were arguing for production speed (which meant cutting corners) whereas the Navy was arguing for quality... the shipyards didn't always listen, and records indicate that some of them got severely docked for that.
...Anyway, I digress. The point being that 'Top Speed' is not 'Full Speed', which in turn is not 'Operational Speed'(*1). In US Navy parlance of the time, a ship's 'Top Speed' was the absolute maximum speed that that particular ship could achieve in a worst case scenario and varied per ship. 'Full Speed' on the other hand was the maximum 'safe' speed for that hull/boiler combo, and was rated on a ship class basis. 'Operational Speed' was just the ship's cruising speed, which we all know was a paltry 15-18kts for most combatants. For an example, the USS Laffey (Sumner) had an Operational Speed of 16kts, a Full Speed of 34kts, and a Top Speed of 40.8kts (achieved post-overhaul during Korea). Of course, exceptions and rules.
The 30kt Fletcher suffered a boiler complication when deploying to the pacific theater. Pearl Harbor mechanics pretty much gave up and sent the ship on its way, de-rating the ship to 30kts. So, I'll hand you that one, it was a mechanical issue that was never addressed (to me, it was valid as it was the ship's listed Top Speed for the rest of its [short] service life).
-edit- (*1) Of course, I'm aware that I'm basically arguing semantics.
kibehisa said: The Fletchers' speed varied, like the Sumners and Gearings after them... sometimes wildly. Several of them actually met or exceeded the design speed; I believe the record for the Fletchers was ~38.6kts (USS Kidd was one of the ones that came close, at the upper 37s). On the other end, you had some of them that struggled to make 34kts (these were promptly sold off to other countries after the war). I believe the record slowest Fletcher was only able to achieve a measly 30kts, which is pitiful no matter how you look at it. This sort of variation is pretty standard in wartime production. So, it's not entirely nonsense when speaking of them, merely exceptions to the rule.
That reminds me of an issue experienced with some of the first B-29 bombers that rolled off the production lines, wherein their empty weights tended to vary by over several hundred pounds. The cause of these variations were eventually traced back to the additive effects of the commercial-grade manufacturing tolerances that were in use at the time.
Perhaps some similar issues with manufacturing tolerances could've been one of the factors in causing the odd variations in performance among U.S. DDs...
Luigi di Savoia Duca Degli Abruzzi-chan.So long...The last of Italy's large light cruisers.Carrier!! We don't have any carriers yet.Neither Germany nor Italy.Uh?How about a light cruiser? We don't have any either.Night battles with foreign ships.Then how about...She was active after the war, until 1961 when she was decommissioned. Her sister ship turned into a guided missile cruiser.If I get a little sister, I want to be her friend.What again?Let's use the connections of our German and Italian girls to request aid from another foreign ship.Ah, neither of our countries have finished building a carrier.Aren't pocket battleships good enough?Then how about Luigi di Savoia Duca Degli Abruzzi-chan?